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In December 2012, over fourteen years after a peace agreement was signed, violent protests involving thousands of unionists erupted in Belfast, the capital of Northern Ireland. The protests mainly focused on Belfast City Hall, the seat of the municipal government, but quickly spread across the region and continued for over forty days. During the protests over one hundred police officers were injured, including one in an attempted murder, a number of politicians were handed death threats and their homes attacked, and an office of a local political party was burned down.​[1]​ 
The immediate cause of the protests was a vote by Belfast City Council’s policy committee on Monday, December 3, 2012 to restrict the flying of the union flag from city hall from all year round to fifteen designated days a year, like the Queen’s birthday. The decision to limit the flying of the flag reflected the balance of power in municipal politics: Irish nationalists outnumber unionists in the council. Nationalists voted to limit the flag flying after they argued it was exclusive and did not recognize their community.​[2]​
In providing an explanation for the extreme level of violence provoked by the flag, media commentators were drawn to how the riots were a manifestation of the wider sociopolitical context.​[3]​ In particular, it was said that the riots were due to unionist frustrations with the ongoing peace process. Thus, the decision to limit the flag was indicative of how unionists believe that the peace process has been asymmetrical insofar as the weight of concessions has been granted to Irish nationalists at the expense of unionists.​[4]​ In articulating their wrath, unionists viewed the removal of the flag as part of a process in which, as one protestor put it, “our whole culture, heritage and traditions are being stripped away from us bit by bit.”​[5]​
Notably, the violent protests over the flag had come at a time when the peace process in Northern Ireland was at its most stable. While the conflict in Northern Ireland had once been framed as “intractable” and impervious to solution,​[6]​ the Good Friday peace agreement of 1998 began a process in which the central issues of conflict were resolved. British troop numbers are now reduced to near pre-conflict levels and most of the major paramilitary groups have disbanded and decommissioned weapons. There have also been major innovations in human rights and equality legislation and the reform of major institutions, particularly the police. Perhaps most importantly, peaceful coexistence was visibly symbolized in 2007 by the sight of once bitter enemies—former Irish Republican Army (IRA) commander Martin McGuinness and unionist hardliner Ian Paisley—sharing a joke as they were sworn in as joint leaders of the power-sharing executive government. Indeed, given its apparent success, the Northern Ireland peace process has been promoted by international leaders as a model for other intractable conflicts.​[7]​ Yet, while the major areas of conflict have been successfully addressed, the flag protests is seen as a matter that could possibly presage a return to sustained violence.​[8]​
The proposition that sectarian conflicts over symbols and rituals in deeply divided societies are a direct consequence of the broader political issues that divide the respective groups is, on the whole, correct. Yet cultural conflicts often refuse to completely abate even when the underlying divisive political issues are substantially addressed in peace processes. In fact, these conflicts have the propensity to ignite intercommunal acrimony and lead to fresh political disputes. Despite this, symbols and rituals are rarely sufficiently detailed in peace agreements, especially the institutional mechanisms and normative principles that could successfully regulate group conflict. Understandably, the principal actors involved in crafting and implementing peace agreements will focus on resolving violent conflict by designing political power-sharing forms, redistributing public resources, demilitarizing and reintegrating insurgents, and reforming the justice system and other major public institutions. These areas are important because they are seen as the most intractable issues to be solved in the implementation of peace agreements. 
 Despite the seemingly intransigent character of these matters, they are amenable to solution. As Barbara F.Walter notes, the problem is not so much that groups view these problems as inherently non-negotiable; in fact, warring groups are often willing to resolve these issues as long as there is reciprocation.​[9]​ These settlements tend to fail, therefore, when there is an absence of intergroup trust, or the expectation that concessions will be honored. Given that the core areas of conflict can reasonably be resolved in agreements, the successful resolution of secondary issues, like symbols and rituals, might be seen as wholly contingent on the lasting accommodation of the broader political issues. While conflicts over symbols and rituals are not wholly independent of the wider political environment in which agreements are implemented, they do deserve serious consideration regarding how they should be accommodated in conflict management structures.
Crucially, while peace agreements may provide specific details about the new constitutional dispensation and state institutions, symbols and rituals are typically dealt with in a desultory fashion. Where they are included, the tendency is to simply state that group-based symbols and rituals should be publically recognized on a basis of equality. Rather than ameliorating intergroup conflict, the politics of recognition can actually exacerbate it, thus ironically creating problems for how the larger issues are resolved.
This article addresses why symbols and rituals can be instruments through which group conflict is articulated in deeply divided societies and the difficulty of dealing with them for the purposes of sustainable conflict management, especially in peace agreements. While the normative proposition underlying many peace agreements regarding symbols and rituals rests on recognition, I argue that a more sophisticated approach which emphasizes the “agonistic” aspects of group conflict is required. Mouffe claims that the task of peacemakers is to transform antagonism into agonism, deadly enemies into peaceful adversaries, violence into critical engagement and reflection.​[10]​ For Mouffe, conflict between groups  is often unavoidable and cannot be eliminated through the operation of abstract reason; instead, a violent clash of democratic political positions can be channelled into progressive political institutions. Although the point is not to achieve consensus between groups on the issues that fundamentally divide them, it is possible to combine contestation with a space for social differences to be heard and recognized by parties. This process encourages adversaries to possess a shared affiliation to the liberal principles of liberty and equality. This form of engagement does not necessarily end conflict between groups nor can it be expected to always lead to positive outcomes.
This article explores why and how symbols and rituals can be instrumental in advancing group identities and intergroup conflict. I show how peace agreements often either neglect symbols and rituals or deal with them via the politics of recognition, a system that can have counterproductive consequences. I analyze alternative methods to peacefully regulate symbols and rituals before finally exploring how Mouffe’s concept of agonism could be usefully deployed. To help examine these important issues, the article uses a range of case studies from divided societies, although Northern Ireland and Macedonia are strongly featured.
The Politics of Recognition and Peace Agreements
Ethnic or ethno-national conflict has commonly come to be framed as fundamentally about contested senses of identity that are often underpinned by inequalities concerning socioeconomics or political representation. The complex interplay between identity-based conflicts and those based on resources is well theorized. Edward E. Azar notes how groups who have had their identities denied “will take action to address their victimization, triggering increased state oppression and escalation of the conflict.”​[11]​ Jay Rothman distinguishes between “identity-based conflicts from interest- or resource-based conflicts, which are relatively concrete and well defined with outcomes bounded by the resources at stake (e.g. wages, land, military power).”​[12]​As such, Rothman argues that “Identity conflicts require that special efforts be made to ensure accurate analysis, definition, and amelioration precisely because such conflicts are not tangible.”​[13]​
By way of explanation, it is possible to distinguish between two types of conflicts present in deeply divided societies. On the one hand there is a desire by groups to obtain their share of economic and political representation. On the other, the desire for the recognition of group identities is qualitatively different from the former as recognition is not a good that can be consumed. In contrast, recognition is an intersubjective state; recognition involves the desire of individuals and groups to have who they are and what they stand for acknowledged by others.​[14]​ 
For recognition theorists, social and political conflict emerges when a group’s identity is misrecognized, unrecognized or palpably demeaned by dominant groups​[15]​ Accordingly, members of groups whose identities are not recognized will lack the basic self-confidence and self-esteem required to fully develop their potential. The struggle of groups to gain recognition, and not mere tolerance, for their differences from others, manifest in political and social institutions, is the vital source of intergroup acrimony. 
Furthermore, since recognition is a precondition for political legitimacy and authority, in deeply divided societies the conflict involves contested senses of political sovereignty. The politics of recognition is predicated on relative and not absolute worth, in contrast to struggles over political and economic representation. This makes the battle for recognition different from struggles over economic redistribution since recognition of identity is zero-sum rather than positive sum. By zero-sum, I refer to the perception of a “winner takes all” dynamic in a divided society in which a gain for one group is directly seen by a rival group as an automatic loss.
In short, the desire of group (a) to have its identity recognized by group (b) becomes inherently conflictual when group (b) refuses on the basis that group (a) has cultural identities that are antagonistic and/or harmful to group (b). Thus, rather than a process of intersubjective reciprocation, the politics of recognition can often lead to destructive clashes. This is not to say that existing structural inequalities between groups are insignificant; the experience of socioeconomic inequity often lies behind a group’s need to have their identities recognized by another group. For example, the demand of Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland to have their ethnonational identities recognized by the dominant unionist group must be placed in the context of their history of experiencing socioeconomic discrimination.
The struggle for recognition involves claims to increased political representation and material resources. However, since social identity is expressed through cultural forms that are seen as inherently belonging to groups, symbols and rituals are key areas of recognition conflicts. Yet, while academic theorists have long been attuned to the potential of ritual and politics to enflame group conflict in divided societies,​[16]​ drafters of peace agreements tend to either ignore the importance of these issues or simply frame recognition as a relatively benign process.
 For example, the 1998 Good Friday Agreement signed in Northern Ireland calls for “parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos, and aspirations of both communities,” nationalists and unionists.​[17]​ It also demands that “All participants acknowledge the sensitivity of the use of symbols and emblems for public purposes, and the need in particular in creating the new institutions to ensure that such symbols and emblems are used in a manner which promotes mutual respect rather than division.”​[18]​ Looking at different conflicts around the globe, a similar trend can be seen. Macedonia’s Ohrid Framework Agreement calls for the government to promote “respect for the identity of communities.”​[19]​ Furthermore: “Members of communities have a right freely to express, foster and develop their identity and community attributes, and to use their community symbols.”​[20]​ Bosnia’s Dayton Agreement, on the other hand, provides only a cursory provision for symbols at the elite state level: “Bosnia and Herzegovina shall have such symbols as are decided by its Parliamentary Assembly and approved by the Presidency.”​[21]​Although Lebanon’s Taif Accord democratically accommodates the identities of the eighteen different sects (Christian and Muslim) in proportion to their demographic, it does not mention the role of symbols and instead simply emphasizes that “Lebanon is Arab in belonging and identity,” a statement that threatens to alienate non-Arab identifying groups, especially the Christian and Shi'a sects.​[22]​
As such, where specified, provisions for symbols and rituals in agreements tend towards their equal recognition in the polity by encouraging an environment in which they are freely displayed. This politics of recognition is eminently understandable. Historically, in deeply divided societies, the identities and, by implication, the symbols and rituals of minority groups have been prohibited by the majority. This has had extremely destabilizing results by exacerbating minority grievances, thereby strengthening the hands of secessionist leaders. 
For example, in Northern Ireland the symbols of the minority Irish nationalists were practically criminalized by the majority unionist government and the British state under the jurisdiction of the 1954 Flags and Emblems Act. The Act had the intention of proscribing the use of nationalist symbols in public space.​[23]​ Even prior to the outbreak of sustained conflict in the region, the ban imposed on nationalist symbols could generate extreme violence. For instance, in Belfast in 1964, the police, under instruction from the unionist Minister of Home Affairs, entered a nationalist district to remove an Irish tricolour flag hanging outside the headquarters of a political party. A riot ensued when thousands of nationalists attempted to stop the police, which resulted in hundreds of injuries. Gerry Adams later stated that witnessing the police remove the Irish flag radicalized him into becoming an active Irish republican.​[24]​
Likewise, under the 1991 Macedonian Constitution, the display of the Albanian national flag was banned, the symbol of the state’s minority ethnic Albanian population. When, in January 1997, ethnic Albanians in the Macedonian towns of Gostivar and Tetovo hoisted the Albanian flag, the constitutional court pronounced the action illegal and ordered the removal of the flags. In response to police attempts to confiscate the flags, protests resulted in three deaths and hundreds of injuries.​[25]​
The prohibition of the symbols and rituals of the main minority groups in both Northern Ireland and Macedonia is profoundly related to how the majority community viewed such forms as indicative of emergent secessionist mobilization. In such societies, the minority group is securitized. By doing so, the state often legitimates the use of extraordinary measures to contain a minority threat by limiting normal democratic processes. Under conditions of securitization the capacity of the minority group to politically mobilize is severely limited. Minority political parties are banned, leaders are arrested without trial, and the raising of minority demands are restricted, including those related to symbols and rituals. If securitization is sustained by state violence, this will probably ignite minority grievances and secessionist tendencies thus, paradoxically, appearing to justify the state’s use of excessive force in the first place.​[26]​
Thus, rather than suppressing secessionist mobilization, the securitization of minority groups is more likely to fuel conflict. As an alternative, the politics of recognition is often advanced as a form of conflict regulation.​[27]​ This strategy supposes that the accommodation of minority groups’ identities will ameliorate their grievances and lead them to feel part of the state. It is also hoped that the recognition of the profoundly multiethnic character of the state will defuse the majority group’s sense of hegemonic cultural dominance over public symbols. As the minority group gains an increasing sense of security for their identities, and the dominant group accepts the state’s multicultural constituency, mutual group respect will be fostered.​[28]​ 
Symbols and Rituals in Conflict
	The politics of recognition outlined above begins with the belief that groups who have had their identities demeaned and proscribed by other groups are likely to rectify the situation and this can take a violent form if frustrated. Successful conflict regulation, therefore, flows from accommodating group-based differences in the polity. I have provisionally argued, however, that the politics of recognition falls short in divided societies wherein the struggle for recognition is inextricably bound up with contests over political legitimacy and state sovereignty. The politics of recognition, in such contexts, exacerbates zero-sum conflicts that tend to be highly resistant to peaceful transformation since both groups’ desires for national self-determination cannot be realized. Furthermore, there is a danger that recognition can be provisional as the state can withdraw its commitment to accommodating minority identities. For example, in 2007, Macedonia’s constitutional court repealed legislation that allowed for ethnic Albanians to publically fly the Albanian flag.​[29]​ 
At this point, the article moves on to explore in more specific detail how symbols and rituals can shape violent conflict in divided societies, thus prompting the need to formulate innovative principles and institutions to mitigate intergroup conflict. This is not to argue that conflict in divided societies is attributable to symbolic and ritualistic forms or even that the presence of different ethnic groups is predictive of conflict. Conflict, Roxanne Saylor Lulofs and Dudley D. Cahn note, occurs depending on the nature of the claims of one group and how they are perceived by other interested groups: “What is at stake is the relationship itself and how the relationship is defined.”​[30]​ The source of conflict, states Francis M. Deng, “lays not so much in the mere fact of differences as in the degree to which the interacting identities and their overriding goals are mutually accommodating or incompatible.”​[31]​
In this sense, the power of symbols and rituals relates to their capacity to illuminate the main issues that divide the protagonists. Ethnic conflict often involves a race to declare one’s own symbolic capital (language, flags, culture) as the valid currency in the nation-state’s constitution. For this particular reason, ethnic conflicts have a zero-sum character which only allows a winner or a loser. As soon as the conflict is all or nothing, it becomes particularly intractable.​[32]​ It is, therefore, possible to identify a number of key reasons why ritual and symbols can be instrumental in shaping ethnic conflict. Importantly, these aspects of ritual and symbols in ethnic conflict overlap and are closely related. 
Group Identity: Ritual and symbolism are a perfect means for expressing group identity and boundaries. Ritual helps “identify the enemy, recounting their moral inferiority, while glorifying the celebrants’ own group.”​[33]​ Ritual binds the participants together and reminds them of their moral commitments, stirs up primary emotions, and reinforces a sense of solidarity with the group.​[34]​ Groups need to socialize their members to the values and expectations that make up the prescribed culture. Ritualized activity, such as initiation ceremonies, achieves this. The sense of collectivity imagined through ritual also illuminates the numeric strength of the group and its capacity to mobilize.  
The iterative nature of many ritual performances is important in generating ethnic divisions. The almost obsessive habit of many ethnic groups to ritualistically mark out territory is likened to an obsessive-compulsive-disorder,​[35]​ which acts as a protective force against contaminants, like the rival ethnic group. Compulsive ritual activity helps the ethnic group demarcate the boundary between purity and danger, pollution and cleanliness and defines the terms of “us” and “them,” “hero” and “friend.”​[36]​ 
Memory: The second important facet of ritual and symbols in ethnic conflict is how groups deploy them to conjure up memories of the past. The ethnic group, states Neil Jarman, “must have a memory of itself that recounts a sense of origin and distinctiveness.”​[37]​ Ethnic groups are “communities of memory.” The performance of memory, expressed through ritualistic acts of commemoration, provides the group a sense of timelessness and unchanging primordial ethnic belonging.  A way in which the past is utilized by groups is through the performance of “social memory”: how the past is actively and selectively used, abused, reworked, transmitted and received in the context of specific groups. Groups remember and shape the past in specific ways to justify contemporary political exigencies.​[38]​ 
In particular, memory is deployed by groups to ensure that the original, seemingly primordial clash of groups is constantly reenacted to legitimate current political conflicts. As such, “the characters that confront each other must be polarized in a representation that imagines the past, even when these are renewed actors at each point in time.”​[39]​ Vamik Volkan, likewise, has written of a “time collapse” in divided societies in which ethnic groups evoke past traumatic events to bolster current political demands. The perennial temptation to revisit past traumas allows the group to blame its rivals for perpetuating ongoing injustices.​[40]​
Symbols: The ritualized performance of symbols is another essential feature of ethnic identity and conflict. The power of symbols is not that they carry meaning inherently; it derives from providing us “the capacity to make meaning.”​[41]​ Symbols are vital for how they personify political power and ethnic groups. Because state power is essentially abstract and invisible, “it must be personified before it can be seen, symbolized before it can be loved, imagined before it can be conceived.”​[42]​ For ethnic leaders, the act of identifying themselves with a national symbol, or even creating a new one, “can be a potent means of gaining and keeping power, for the hallmark of power is the construction of reality.”​[43]​ Flags, monuments, landscapes and national stereotypes all come to symbolize the specific character of the ethnic group. Symbols are also the means through which groups dehumanize despised rival ethnic groups to ensure that their extermination is little more than an act of cleansing the moral community from unwanted “vermin.” Nazi propaganda compared Jews with rats, Tajik leaders called the Hazara people “mules,” and Hutu Power labelled Tutsis as an “inyenzi” (cockroaches) before going out to butcher them.​[44]​ 
Absent Agency: Ritual appears to negate agency; that is, participating individuals often seem to be carrying out a traditional rite that has been performed unchangingly for centuries. Such rituals, as Paul Connerton argues, “contain a measure of insurance against the process of cumulative questioning entailed in all discursive practices.”​[45]​ Moreover, because ritual can relate to supernatural entities, individuals can appear to be governed by external agents or even possessed by otherworldly spirits. Although on the surface ritual seems to divest individuals of their agency, “in ritual one both is, and is not, the author of one’s acts.”​[46]​
 Extreme ethnic violence is often recorded as being performed in ritualistic acts in which the participants appear to be controlled by forces they claim to no longer control. As Anton Blok notes, “one can detect in the ritualization of violence attempts to avoid moral responsibility for killing ‘fellow’ human beings.”​[47]​ The most extreme example of this is perhaps the “carnivalesque” aspect of violence. The carnivalesque allows actors a temporary license from ordinary constraints in which extremes of behavior are common. The Frenki’s Boys, the Serbian militia responsible for atrocities in Bosnia and Kosovo, wore cowboy hats over ski masks and painted Indian stripes on their faces. Sporting clown wigs and flamboyantly colored pajama suits, the Hutu militia responsible for murdering Tutsis in Rwanda “promoted genocide as a carnival romp.”​[48]​ The carnivalesque allowed some individuals to practically dissociate themselves from any personal responsibility for the violence they conducted. One Hutu killer claimed: “We were taken over by Satan ...We were not ourselves … You wouldn’t be normal if you start butchering people for no reason.”​[49]​ This is not to say that ritualized violence lacks an instrumental objective. For instance, in the Bosnian war of the 1990s, status degradation rituals including rape were conducted by Serb militias to make Bosniaks appear non-human as part of ethnic cleansing strategies.​[50]​ 
Shared and Reframing Symbols
	Given the importance of ritual and symbols in shaping ethnic conflict, it is essential to create institutional frameworks that can peacefully regulate disputes. As mentioned previously, where peace agreements include provisions to deal with symbols, the underlying normative principle has been the politics of recognition. Rather than resolving conflict, this can often exacerbate fractious intergroup relations. What, then, are the alternatives that might usefully be harnessed for conflict resolution?
Shared Symbols and Rituals
	Can rituals and symbols contribute towards peace by creating shared identities? This theory presupposes that rituals and symbols have the capacity to transcend ethnic cleavages by emphasizing a shared identity between groups. The potential of symbols and rituals to forge a common identity may be particularly significant in deeply divided societies. While there may be a perception that there are immutable differences between groups, the groups often share a long history of coexistence. For instance, as part of his “journey into the new nationalisms,” Michael Ignatieff observed that “An outsider is struck, not by the differences between Serbs and Croats, but by how similar they are. They both speak the same language … and have shared the same village way of life for centuries.”​[51]​ As such, in divided societies it is commonplace for groups to have a shared affiliation to particular symbols and rituals. 
In peace processes, such a politics of commonality can be achieved either through re-appropriating existing symbols and rituals and changing their meaning or creating new ones that emphasize sharing.  An example of the former is the Stari Most bridge in Mostar Bosnia, connecting Croat and Bosnian districts, which was rebuilt after the war and made a symbol by UNESCO of the shared history between the groups. The sight of Nelson Mandela sporting the Springbok jersey of the South African rugby team in 1995, a team hitherto seen as the embodiment of a racist Afrikaaner ethos, is often evoked as the foundation of a unified post-apartheid South African identity.​[52]​ St. Patrick, the patron saint of Ireland, has been utilized by peace groups in Northern Ireland: “On St. Patrick’s Day we should emphasise the things that unite us rather than what divides us.”​[53]​
While reasonable, the assumption that common symbols and rituals in divided societies generate peaceful intercommunal relations is deeply problematic. Forms that ostensibly appear to supersede divisions can also be a focus for acrimony. Simon Harrison has outlined how symbols in divided societies that appear shared can lead to “proprietary conflicts” as the contending groups seek to “trademark” and claim sole ownership over them.​[54]​ Such conflicts occur, according to Harrison, precisely because of the similarities between groups. Following Freud’s concept of the “narcissim of minor differences,”​[55]​ Harrison claims that it is the existence of close similarities rather than broad differences between groups that stimulates conflict.​[56]​ Ignatieff continues this theme: “Nationalism is the most violent where the group you are defining yourself against most closely resembles you.”​[57]​ 
Yet, rather than viewing conflicts as the product of antagonistic mimesis, it is better to understand them as the result of struggles over political legitimacy. In divided societies the legitimacy of state sovereignty forms the basis of violent conflict. By demanding ownership of key symbols and rituals, groups seek to strengthen their claims to political legitimacy at the expense of rivals. Smith has noted how symbolic forms can evoke a “descent myth,” a narrative which inextricably connects the ethnic group to a particular territory.​[58]​ Symbols rooted in ancient mythology contain a particular efficacy for stating political legitimacy which derives from its “ahistorical character”: “Myth is beyond time...it blocks off the past, making it impervious to rationalistic scrutiny.”​[59]​ 
Symbols and rituals that are common to groups in divided societies are highly prone to conflicts stemming from contests of political legitimacy. A good example is the struggle over the ancient Vergina symbol in Macedonia. When Macedonia achieved its independence in the early1990s, the ethnic Macedonian state adopted the Vergina symbol as an official emblem in order to provide an aura of continuity with the ancient past. This proprietary claim was challenged by ethnic Greeks in the state, and the Greek government, which argued that Macedonians had misappropriated their rightful symbol.​[60]​ 
Similarly, in Northern Ireland, while both Catholic nationalists and Protestant unionists recognize the symbol of St. Patrick, they have also clashed by articulating mutually exclusive identities for the symbol. Indeed, since the eighteenth century the Catholic and Protestant churches appropriated St. Patrick as evidence of the early origins of their respective churches in Ireland. This conflict has had an ethnonational character during the recent conflict in the region. For Irish nationalists, St. Patrick’s Day became a focus for celebrating Irish nationalism and for hosting political parades. In response, unionists challenged the idea that St. Patrick was automatically a nationalist symbol by characterizing him as a “prototype Protestant.”​[61]​ 
This conflict over the control of St. Patrick has intensified during the peace process. In 1998, the year of the peace agreement, Irish nationalists held the first major St. Patrick’s Day parade in Belfast city center. For nationalists, the parade represented the equal recognition of Irish identity in a space where Irish nationalist events had once been banned. A nationalist newspaper commented that the parade participants “were shedding the pages of past wrongs, binning the Belfast of … second-class citizenship.”​[62]​ For unionist politicians, alternatively, the parade was not sufficiently inclusive and they withdrew support for funding. In response, a leading nationalist politician claimed that unionists’ refusal to support funding of the parade was a denial of “positive political positions on equality and recognition of nationalist rights.”​[63]​ 
As explored already, simply viewing common symbols and rituals in divided societies as facilitating a peaceful and shared coexistence is problematic. This observation, however, does not mean that we should dispense altogether with the job of developing shared symbols and rituals that can contribute towards peacebuilding. This task is achieved best when symbols and rituals are deployed to accommodate in a meaningful way the identities of the whole population. This can be facilitated by combining existing symbols or setting them together in a new overarching symbol. 
An instructive illustration concerns the restructuring of the police service in Northern Ireland.  As part of the Good Friday Agreement, it was decided to reform the police service, part of which included designing “a new badge and symbols which are entirely free from any association with either the British or Irish states.”​[64]​ Unionists viewed the proposed symbolic reform as an attempt to delegitimize unionist identity and state sovereignty, especially as the new symbol would not feature the traditional crown motif. The issue was resolved after political wrangling between unionist and nationalist politicians when they decided on a badge that contained both nationalist and unionist symbols that would satisfy each community.​[65]​
Reframing Symbols and Rituals
	As noted above, while in certain circumstances shared symbols and rituals can be fashioned for peacebuilding, shared forms can also be the focus of intergroup contestation. Furthermore, many conflicts over symbols and rituals in divided societies involve forms that are deeply divisive rather than common to all. For Marc Howard Ross, ritual and symbols can be “psychocultural dramas”: practices that represent one group to its members become polarizing when their expression is felt as a threat by a second group, and/or when attempts to limit the practices are perceived as a threat by the group performing them. This exacerbates conflict as “opponents frequently operate from such different frames that they misunderstand each other and fail to see how their own actions might be contributing to the escalatory spiral.”​[66]​ 
A clear example of this can be seen in Croatia in 1990. On Palm Sunday 1990, Franjo Tuđman, the newly elected nationalist leader of Croatia, publically kissed the šahovnica, Croatia’s red-and-white checkerboard national emblem. For Croats, the pageant represented the moment when Croatian nationalism was finally reborn. For many Serbs resident in Croatia—known as the Krajina Serbs—Tuđman’s spectacle generated altogether different emotions. The sight of a rejuvenated Croat nationalism, especially the unveiling of the šahovnica, evoked the memory of the feared Ustaše, the Nazi-backed Croatian nationalist movement which massacred Serbs during the Second World War under the šahovnica.​[67]​ 
Serbian leaders were quick to remind the Krajina Serbs that Tuđman’s nationalism was the renaissance of the Ustaše state which would once again butcher Serbs in the thousands. Within months Serbs could point to how their grim forecast was being fulfilled as Serbs were dispelled from the judiciary, government and the police and replaced by Croats.​[68]​ While the Croats had originally hoped to keep Serbian areas of Croatia within the new nation by offering them some federal powers,​[69]​ the ritualized display of Croat nationalist symbols and the prohibition of Serbian symbols provided Serbian nationalist leaders the opportunity to demand that they remain in a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia. Within a year war had broken out between Serbian and Croat forces.
When  rituals and/or symbols are  polarizing, what are the appropriate mechanisms to help mitigate the possibility of destructive conflict?  Ross has outlined how ritual and symbolism, within limits, can be made malleable for different readings.  New narratives can be developed “which do not directly challenge older ones, but which reframe them in more inclusive terms that deemphasize the emotional significance of differences between groups and identify shared goals and experiences,” such as civic values or a past of coexistence.​[70]​
In Ross’s helpful model, peacebuilders are required to concentrate their efforts on trying to subtly alter the meaning of rituals and symbols that are aggressively divisive. While the overall form of the symbol/ritual remains; the antagonistic “hardedges” are softened by changing the content.  Peacebuilding, therefore, demands “changing perceptions of the conflict and softening out-group boundaries by redefining collective identities in ways that are empowering and yet less polarizing.”​[71]​
A pertinent example of reframing identities is seen in Belfast in recent years. The city’s municipal authority has sponsored an ongoing project entitled “Reimaging Belfast.” The project involves changing the visual content of paramilitary murals in the city. These murals have traditionally been dominated by images that glorify paramilitary violence or have featured narratives that present history as a continuous struggle for group survival against the perceived genocidal policies of ethnic rivals. The “Reimaging Belfast” project has sponsored the replacement of violent imagery with images that may still reflect the particularistic histories of the respective ethnic groups but, importantly, are not tied to the politics of ethnic antagonism. For instance, murals now display images of local sporting heroes or represent issues relating to unemployment or the consequences of urban regeneration on working-class nationalist and unionist communities.​[72]​
Reframing narratives may be particularly useful when antagonistic identities clash. Rather than allow a zero-sum logic to develop, the narratives enshrined in ritual and symbolic forms can be constructed so as to allow more nuanced views of the other side. Central to this dynamic, states Marc Howard Ross, is mutual acknowledgement of each other’s perceptions and concerns; such acknowledgement is often implicit rather than explicit, and may not involve acceptance of the other’s point of view.​[73]​ Such gestures, however, require at least a modicum of goodwill between the groups. 
While the reframing of identities is a fruitful approach to conflict management, it is nevertheless based on the premise that group identities are important and deserve recognition, albeit in a framework where antagonistic narratives are softened or altered. The task is to help the respective groups transcend destructive patterns of conflict by reframing their positions and interests so as to facilitate positive-sum constructive outcomes. The utilization of excellent third-party actors is of immense importance here, as it is they who work unofficially with the conflict parties to foster new thinking and relationships. They seek to explore what the roots of the conflict really are and to identify creative solutions that the parties may have missed in their commitment to entrenched positions.​[74]​
Nevertheless, a problem which can arise in attempts to transform and reframe conflict via third-party actors and mediators is that the conflict parties may become too reliant on exogenous help at the expense of the localized dynamics required for long-term peacebuilding. Reframing symbols and rituals may act to ignore the relationship between groups and focus instead on shifting the specific, antagonistic identities and interests of the groups.
At this point, the paper explores a more radical proposal, Chantal Mouffe’s idea of agonistic conflict, and further seeks to apply it for the peaceful regulation of symbols and rituals in divided regions.
From Antagonism to Agonism
In essence, the accommodative approach to divided regions, on which the politics of recognition is based, seeks to neutralize conflict. In this framework, intergroup competition is viewed as inherently destructive, and is to be replaced by a system that accommodates group identities on the basis of equality. This process can fail when mutually exclusive claims to recognition and legitimacy clash. What might an alternative to the politics of recognition look like? 
There are two key observations that could be productive for sustainable conflict regulation. The first is that conflict, in distinction to the accomodationist perspective, does not necessarily need to be neutralized, but can instead be viewed as the lifeblood of positive social and political change. Secondly, the normative starting point for developing frameworks to mitigate destructive symbolic conflict does not need to be the politics of recognition. In contrast, the process could begin with the idea that cultural practices do not belong inherently to any group or automatically deserve recognition in the public sphere. Recognition can only be contingent, and must be forged through intergroup debate on the validity of identities.
Looking at the first observation in more detail, it flows from the premise that intergroup conflict can be channelled into important and peaceful social change. All societies are riven by conflict regardless of whether they appear to be ethnically homogeneous or extremely plural. These conflicts can be over economic, health and gender inequalities, over the role of religion and secular values in public life and involving various political and cultural identities. Not all conflict is destructive and violent; conflict can engender peaceful, positive change, such as delivering forms of social equality. Chantal Mouffe’s concept of agonism is the best articulation of the positive characteristic of group-based conflict. 
 Mouffe departs from the liberal model of trying to reconcile diverse values and identities through the forging of consensus, which involves integrating different world views into a form of value pluralism. Value pluralism develops from the belief that groups are motivated purely by rational self-interest and moral considerations, and conflict can be ameliorated through satisfying such demands. In contrast, Mouffe observes that “deep passions” also fundamentally lie at the root of group identities; conflicts cannot simply be resolved through the exercise of abstract reasoning, and it is not always possible to relegate such passions to the private sphere.​[75]​ There are deeply antagonistic conflicts in which groups simply refuse to rescind their core identities and objectives, which clash with rival groups’ equally intransigent sense of self-worth. 
For Mouffe, the point is not always to try and find consensus as this may ignore the major clashes between groups, which if neutralized can lead to destructive contests. The important process, alternatively, is to shift conflict from an antagonistic framework, in which groups seek to eliminate the validity of the rival group’s identities, to one where the groups view each other as worthy adversaries. Despite holding irreconcilable views, groups should be recognized as having legitimate positions. Notwithstanding this, agonism is not strictly teleological insofar as it is conceived as finally resolving conflict. Political power and legitimacy cannot be fixed once and for all, but rather a provisional settlement that is always contested in a continual struggle for hegemony.​[76]​
Two points  are germane for the discussion that has taken place in this paper. First, the recognition aspect of agonism is not a mere appendage of relativism, the idea that all identities are equally valid and must be accommodated in the polity. In contrast, agonism is predicated on distinct boundaries. While groups view each other as worthy adversaries, they must have “a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy: liberty and equality.”​[77]​ Groups that hold deeply illiberal values or are wedded to pursuing violence at the expense of democratic means cannot be included in any institutional framework. 
Second, Mouffe’s concept of agonism takes seriously the emotional and passionate dimensions of group identities and conflict. That is, intergroup conflict cannot simply be resolved by addressing the material dimensions of division, especially concerning socioeconomic inequalities. Issues pertaining to the emotional and affective ways in which group identity is expressed, and how groups need to have their self-worth accepted by others, is tangibly different though not unrelated to the need for policies of economic redistribution and equitable political representation. What is important, however, is that these powerful sentiments and values are mobilized and channelled in positive directions, such as the search for social justice.
My second observation is that institutions designed to diminish conflict should not start from the basis of simple recognition. This may appear somewhat in contrary to Mouffe’s demand that groups recognize the validity of their rivals’ identities. Yet Mouffe is merely pointing out that groups have the right to hold particularistic views, within reason, and that they cannot be wished away merely through the deployment of rational deliberation. In this sense, recognition entails only that certain forms and identities are meaningful for groups, not that they blindly deserve legitimacy or respect. Groups cannot claim that their symbols and rituals merit recognition in the public sphere simply because they view such forms as essential to their identity and self-worth. To affirm such a position risks acceding to the misconception that culture is without agency, that it is somehow primordial, embedded in social structure and it inextricably shapes who we are as members of groups. Instead, it is vital to apprehend the process by which political identities, and hence subjectivity are constructed, often via the use of symbols and rituals, as forms of difference, and constituted through acts of power.​[78]​
In this sense, the politics of “agonism”” in peace processes provides a framework for the encounter between adversaries that is regulated by a set of democratic procedures accepted by the groups. Groups contest the importance of their symbols and ritualistic practices but this does not presume political legitimacy. Legitimacy may be given at different points; it is more important that antagonistic conflict can be channelled into positive social and political change.
Although Mouffe states that institutions are important to agonistic conflict, she is light on detailing their precise form.​[79]​ Problematically, peace agreements have rarely specified institutional structures to deal with symbolic and ritualistic conflicts beyond the principle of recognition. In some instances, such as Northern Ireland, the capacity of rituals and symbols to expedite antagonistic conflict in the aftermath of agreements has meant that ad hoc additional institutions have been constructed later to try and mediate conflicting cultural claims, such as the formation of the Parades Commission to adjudicate on contentious public parades. This paper has stopped short of specifying the specific content of any institutions designed for rituals and symbols in peace processes. This, of course, needs to be negotiated during agreements and can have some degree of flexibility due to the particular characteristics of the divided society. 
Conclusion
The importance of dealing with symbols and conflict in peace processes is apparent in many case studies. To return to Northern Ireland, fourteen years after the signing of a peace agreement, many of the main issues once seen as intractable have been resolved: political power sharing, decommissioning and demilitarization, equality legislation and institutional reform of the police. Yet, the issues that are a cause of violent conflict and instability often revolve around symbols and rituals. Similarly, in Macedonia, a decade after a peace agreement was signed to end violence by accommodating the minority Albanian community, debates about the construction of new symbols in the capital have threatened to collapse the ethnic power-sharing government.​[80]​ 
This article has explored how issues surrounding symbols and rituals are treated in peace agreements and in peacebuilding. I have noted that the underlying framework for ameliorating conflict over these issues in peace agreements is recognition, which can exacerbate intergroup acrimony. Nor can it be assumed that the termination of such conflict is dependent upon a range of seemingly more important issues being addressed, such as socioeconomic inequalities, the reform of political and state institutions, and the disarmament of belligerents. Although the peaceful resolution of these elements is of critical importance, destructive intergroup conflict over symbols can arise even after these issues have been resolved.  
It has been argued in this article that rituals and symbols, as they relate to the performance of identity in divided societies, merit innovative institutions to ensure that they can be peacefully deployed. Towards this, the article has reviewed some specific suggestions regarding mechanisms and frameworks to ameliorate conflict over symbols and rituals in divided societies, including creating shared, inter-communal forms and/or subtly reframing their meaning. Yet while these processes can have some success, they do not always regulate conflict. Shared forms can be subject to intergroup contestation and the project of reframing the meaning of symbols and rituals is often too reliant on expert third-party mediators. 
As an alternative, this paper has deployed Mouffe’s concept of agonism, which looks at how an antagonistic clash of different group identities can be channelled into positive social and political change. This framework, which takes seriously the emotive and passionate aspects of conflict, accommodates dissensus rather than searching for an unrealistic consensus. Critics of Mouffe may reasonably point to the lack of specific detail that is forthcoming concerning the form and content of appropriate institutions needed to engender agonistic conflict. Rather than detailing a universal institutional template for agonism, it is best to tailor such institutional designs to the particular characteristics of the society in question.
Nevertheless, the need for peace agreements and peace processes to provide specific principles and institutions that manage the public display of rituals and symbols is one of enormous importance and should not be relegated to secondary concerns. Although conflicts in divided societies are typically generated by historical inequalities between groups in regards to political representation and economics, intense clashes are also sparked by the validity of group-based rituals and symbols. Rituals and symbols evoke such passions because they are public displays of group identity and groups wish to have who they are recognized by others. Such demands for recognition underpin claims to political legitimacy and state sovereignty, which forms, in turn, the basis for ethno-national conflict. These identity conflicts require special modes of thinking and institutional frameworks to ensure peaceful resolution. 
Appendix:  Major Conflicts over Symbols and Rituals in Northern Ireland and Macedonia (1997-present)
Northern Ireland
Drumcree: (1998-present) 
Conflict: A Protestant Orange Order March was banned by the security forces from entering an Irish nationalist district on its return from a church. Protests by unionists result in over 600 attacks on the 2,000 strong security forces and over 300 protestors were arrested.
Solution: The parade through the nationalist district continues to be banned.
Belfast City Hall (December 2012-present) Belfast City Council's policy committee vote to restrict the flying of the union flag from the city hall from all year round to fifteen designated days a year. Unionist protests last over forty days.
Solution: Flag policy remains.
St. Patrick’s Day: (1998-present) 
Conflict: Irish nationalist events were banned from taking place in Belfast city center until 1993. In 1998 Irish nationalists organize a publically funded St. Patrick’s Day celebration in the city center. Unionist politicians claim that the parade is not sufficiently cross-communal and withdraw their support for the parade. 
Solution: An attempt is made to make the parade cross-communal by limiting the flying of national flags at the parade. 
The Police (1999-2001) 
Conflict: As part of the Good Friday Agreement, it was decided to reform the police service in Northern Ireland, including designing a new badge without its traditional crown motif. Unionists viewed the proposed symbolic reform as an attempt to delegitimize unionist identity and state sovereignty. 
Solution: A badge is created containing both nationalist and unionist symbols.
Macedonia
Gostivar and Tetevo (1997) 
Conflict: The Macedonian government pass a law allowing local Albanian councils to fly the Albanian and Turkish national flags but only on certain Macedonian national holidays. In protests by ethnic Albanians and attempts by the security forces to remove the Albanian flag from a town hall, three deaths and over 300 injuries are sustained. 
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